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Highlights
– In the current context, where public budgets are overstretched due to the economic 
crisis, there is a pressing need to understand the fiscal implications of climate poli-
cies. Policies intended to achieve decarbonization will impact both sides of a coun-
try’s budget via changes in the tax levels and composition of taxes on the one hand, 
as well as transfer payments and direct investments on the other. 
– Back-of-the-envelope calculations – comparing net public revenues in 2020 for 
a Baseline and an Enhanced Policy scenario – show that the additional revenues 
from carbon pricing and the reduction in revenues from excise taxes on fossil fuels 
clearly dominate other direct and indirect effects of policies on public budgets such 
as the additional expenditures dedicated to RD&D targeting low-carbon technolo-
gies. 
– The aggregated net budget impact of all direct and indirect effects of new climate 
policies implemented in the Enhanced Policy Scenario on public budgets in 2020 
for the EU-27 as a whole – given our simplyfying assumptions – amounts to ad-
ditional net public revenues of about €12.6bn (0.09% in terms of the EU-27 GDP) 
under medium-level abatement costs. This makes a non-negligible impact which is 
nevertheless much lower than the impact on public accounts from changes in main 
macroeconomic variables over time.
– Differences among Member States mainly depend on the additional revenues they 
will obtain from carbon pricing, which are driven by three main factors: the car-
bon intensity of the economy, which is positively correlated with the absolute value 
of the net budget impact of new policies; the share of non-ETS GHG emissions, 
which is positively correlated with the net budget impact; and the reduction in 
GHG emissions resulting from new policies, which is negatively correlated with 
this impact.
– Countries most significantly affected, both positively and negatively, are among the 
“new” Member States in the EU-27. In contrast, the impact of new climate policies 
on large EU-15 economies would be generally positive and typically in line with 
average EU values. Therefore, authorities from the EU-15 may consider the option 
of sharing the economic burden of the transition to a low-carbon economy among 
EU countries, taking into account their economic strength.
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Background
The transition to a low-carbon energy system will impact both 
sides of a country’s budget, i.e. revenues (via e.g. changes in the 
composition of taxes or tax levels) and expenditures (via trans-
fer payments or direct investments). In the current context, 
where public budgets are overstretched due to the economic 
crisis, there is a pressing need to understand the implications 
of climate policies on the fiscal situation. Climate policies in-
creasing public revenues could help to reduce state debt, while 
policies significantly increasing public expenses could be dif-
ficult to implement. 
To combat climate change and reduce energy import depend-
ence, the European Council in 2007 agreed on “20-20-20” cli-
mate and energy targets to be met in the mid-term. The cli-
mate and energy package supporting the achievement of these 
targets came into law in 2009 (see Box 1). Our policy brief 
summarizes the main findings of a quantitative study we made 
to investigate the impact of the EU 2020 climate objectives on 
the fiscal balance of Member States in the year 2020. 
Climate policies induce both direct and indirect effects
Assessing the impact of new energy and climate policy instru-
ments on public budgets is a key issue both for analytical and 
policy purposes. Such new policies will directly impact pub-
lic budgets by generating new revenue and new expenditure 
flows; governments might obtain additional revenues from 
carbon pricing and face an increase in expenditures associat-
ed with direct public support to RD&D targeting low-carbon 
technologies (assuming that feed-in tariffs or green certificates 
are expenses borne by private agents and therefore not affect-
ing the state budget). 
In addition to the direct effects, most climate policy instru-
ments will also affect other decisions of individual economic 
agents on the use of resources, and the economy at large. Those 
indirect effects are harder to predict. They include changes in 
state revenues and expenses caused by the impact of climate 
policy on economic output (both its level and sectoral com-
position), prices and inflation, production and consumption, 
unemployment, or interest rates. Particularly relevant for the 
present purposes appear to be impact coming from the chang-
es in GDP as well as the changes in state revenues from excise 
taxes on fossil fuels. Figure 1 summarizes all direct and indi-
rect effects of climate policy on public budgets considered in 
our analysis. 
Making use of publicly available data on the future equilibrium 
of the energy sector of EU Member States, we have determined 
through back-of-the-envelope calculations the difference be-
tween net revenues in 2020 in two situations: a Baseline sce-
nario (mainly including a strengthening of ETS and energy 
efficiency regulations), and a more ambitious Enhanced Policy 
scenario (considering additional carbon taxation in non-ETS 
sectors, further support to RES deployment, and additional 
energy efficiency regulations).2 Computations make use of 
a number of simplifying assumptions that are necessary to 
quantify the respective impacts in a tractable way without us-
ing too complex simulation models (see Box 2).
2  These scenarios are reported in EC (2009, “EU Ener-
gy Trends to 2030”). Parameters characterizing the energy sec-
tors of all 27 EU Member States in 2020 have been computed 
by a consortium led by the National Technical University of 
Athens (E3MLab) using the PRIMES and GEM-E3 models. 
Box 1: Climate and energy policy package
The so called 20-20-20 targets, on which the European 
Council agreed in 2007 include a// a reduction of EU green-
house gas (GHG) emissions by at least 20% with respect to 
1990 levels; b// meeting a minimum of 20% of EU energy 
consumption using renewable resources (RES); and c// the 
reduction of EU primary energy use by at least 20% com-
pared to projected levels. The respective policy package 
came into law in 2009. It includes both a strengthening of 
policy tools already available and the implementation of 
new instruments, standing mainly on three pillars: 1// a re-
vision and strengthening of the emissions trading system 
(ETS; Directive 2009/29/EC); 2// an Effort Sharing Agree-
ment governing GHG emissions from sectors not covered 
by the EU ETS (Decision 406/2009/EC); and 3// binding na-
tional targets for renewable energy which collectively will 
raise the average RES share across the EU to 20% by 2020 
with a sub-target of a 10% share in the transport sector 
(Directive 2009/28/EC). 
Hence, whereas there are mandatory targets in place for 
RES and GHG emissions, the 20% target of a decrease in 
primary energy use is not yet legally binding. The climate 
and energy package does not address energy efficiency 
and energy savings explicitly, even though creating some 
indirect pressure to reduce energy consumption. However, 
in December 2010, the European Parliament voted in favor 
of a binding energy saving target of at least 20% by 2020.
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Among direct effects considered, additional revenues from 
carbon pricing clearly dominate the additional expenditures 
dedicated to RD&D targeting low-carbon technologies. Net 
public revenues in the year 2020 directly generated by climate 
policies applied in the Baseline scenario range between €52 
and 123bn for the EU-27 as a whole depending on the carbon 
abatement cost level considered. Net incremental public reve-
nues directly stemming from the application of new policies in 
an Enhanced Policy scenario range from a maximum of €71bn 
(0.55% in terms of the EU-27 GDP) in the case of high abate-
ment costs, to a negative value of -€10bn (-0.06% of GDP) if 
abatement costs are low. Reaching a given objective in terms of 
emission reductions requires the application of higher carbon 
prices the higher carbon abatement costs are. This would result 
Figure 1: Major direct and indirect impacts of climate policy on public budgets
Direct impacts 
from:
Carbon pricing
Increase in subsidies to low-carbon technologies 
(i.e. RD&D)
Indirect impacts 
from:
Changes to the 
use of resources 
by agents
[no revenue recycling 
considered]
Change in tax revenues and expenses from 
changes to the GDP
Change in revenues from excise taxes on fossil 
fuels
Change in subsidies to fossil fuels
Net Budget Impact
Box 2: Underlying assumptions 
The social cost of replacing high-carbon products with 
low-carbon ones is assumed to be equal to the costs in-
curred by industries when abating carbon. Based on this 
assumption, we estimate the isolated impact that the 
shift to low-C products will have on national GDPs. 
We do not consider changes made to public policies 
other than climate policy ones. Hence, any recycling of 
state revenues or the sourcing of state expenses result-
ing from climate policies are not taken into account; in 
the same vein welfare (or distributional) effects are not 
treated. 
Given the uncertainty about future levels of carbon 
abatement cost, we consider three different possible fu-
tures corresponding to three different abatement cost 
levels. Based on information in the literature and mak-
ing use of simplifying assumptions, we have derived the 
level of carbon prices to be applied in each future and in 
our two respective policy scenarios:
Baseline scenario Enhanced policy scenario
Low abatement cost [interval between zero 
and 45€/tCO
2 
differing among MS]
ETS auction price of €25/t CO
2
No carbon tax for non-ETS sectors
Uniform price of €10/t CO
2
 
[weighted average of prices published in EC (2009) for 
ETS (€16.5/t CO
2
) and non-ETS sectors (€5.3/t CO
2
)]
Medium abatement cost [15…60€/tCO
2
] ETS auction price of €40/t CO
2
No carbon tax for non-ETS sectors
Uniform price (weighted average of prices in ETS and 
non-ETS sectors) of €25/t CO
2
High abatement cost [30…75€/tCO
2
] ETS auction price of €55/t CO
2
No carbon tax for non-ETS sector
Uniform price (weighted average of prices in ETS and 
non-ETS sectors) of €40/t CO
2
4Policy Brief 2011/05
Florence School of Regulation
in higher revenues from carbon taxes and from the auctioning 
of ETS allowances, and therefore a more positive change in the 
net public budget given a level of innovation subsidies.
Within the indirect effects of the policies applied in the En-
hanced Policy scenario, the most relevant ones are the de-
crease in excise tax revenues from fossil fuels and the decrease 
in tax revenues related to the impact of these policies on GDP. 
Changes in state revenues associated with changes in GDP 
probably are the main factor driving differences among coun-
tries. The overall net indirect impact of new policies ranges 
from a decrease in net public revenues in the EU-27 equivalent 
to 0.03% of the EU GDP (for low carbon abatement costs) to a 
decrease equivalent to 0.23% of the EU GDP (for high abate-
ment costs).
Given the assumptions made, all considered direct and indirect 
effects of new climate policies amount to a net increase in the 
public revenues of the EU-27 in 2020 of about €12.6bn (0.09% 
of the EU-27 GDP) for medium abatement costs. This makes a 
non-negligible impact which is nevertheless much lower than 
the impact of changes in main macroeconomic variables over 
time. The main factors contributing to the overall impact are 
the additional revenues from carbon pricing, the decrease in 
revenues from excise taxes on fossil fuels and that of revenues 
from general taxes caused by the impact of the new policies on 
GDP. Differences among countries are mainly related to dif-
ferences in carbon pricing revenues, which are driven by three 
main factors: 1-the carbon intensity of the economy, which is 
positively correlated with the absolute value of the net budget 
impact of new policies; 2-the share of non-ETS GHG emis-
sions, which is positively correlated with the net budget im-
pact; 3-and the reduction in GHG emissions resulting from 
the new policies, which is negatively correlated with this im-
pact.3 
Is there any need to support the EU climate policy imple-
mentation through cross-country burden sharing?
The impact of new climate policies on state budgets varies 
widely across countries (see Figure 2). Countries most signifi-
cantly affected, both positively and negatively, are among the 
“new” Member States. Notably Bulgaria and Estonia are the 
two countries that, given our assumptions, could experience a 
decrease in net public revenues larger than 0.5% of their GDP 
in some of the scenarios considered. Both are countries with 
a small and highly carbon-intensive economy and a low GDP-
per-capita. Thus, implementing ambitious climate policies in 
these countries may require external support. “New” Mem-
3  Computed values have to be regarded with due rea-
son; the absolute level of the budget impact of new climate 
policies in the Enhanced Policy scenario is quite sensitive to 
assumptions made within this analysis. However, our analysis 
allowed us to determine the order of magnitude of the main 
effects of new climate policies on public budgets. Besides, rela-
tive differences among countries (in the impact of new policies 
on their net public revenues) seem to be robust. 
Figure 2: “Net Budget Impact” of new policies on state revenues
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ber States whose public accounts may be most positively af-
fected by the implementation of new climate policy measures 
in any scenario are Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania. 
If abatement costs are high, these countries could experience 
an increase in their net state revenues representing more than 
1% of their GDP. The economies of these countries are also 
carbon-intensive and their GDP-per-capita is low. Thus, extra 
state revenues should be employed to their own country ben-
efits instead of supporting the “losers” in the decarbonization 
process. 
In contrast, the impact of new climate policy instruments on 
large economies from the EU-15 is expected to be relatively 
small, generally positive, and typically in line with average 
EU values. Taking into account their economic strength, state 
authorities may consider the option of sharing the economic 
burden that the transition to a low-carbon economy may rep-
resent for those countries most negatively affected.
Finally, the new climate policies have to be financed in a con-
text of substantial budget adjustments necessary to correct 
large short-term deficits and to avoid an explosion of debt 
in the long-term. Therefore public finance variables like the 
fragility of state budgets, the level of fiscal pressure and the 
expected growth of economies may affect the implementation 
of climate policies. The higher the financial fragility of a coun-
try, the more difficult the implementation of expensive climate 
policies may be, while stronger expected growth rates could 
provide more room for the latter. 
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